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ABSTRACT: The health care delivery system is changing rapidly, with providers form-
ing patient-centered medical homes and exploring the creation of accountable care orga-
nizations. Enactment of the Affordable Care Act will likely accelerate these changes. 
Significant delivery system reforms will simultaneously affect the structures, capabilities, 
incentives, and outcomes of the delivery system. With so many changes taking place at 
once, there is a need for a new tool to track progress at the community level. Many of 
the necessary data elements for a delivery system reform tracking tool are already being 
collected in various places and by different stakeholders. The authors propose that all ele-
ments be brought together in a unified whole to create a detailed picture of delivery system 
change. This brief provides a rationale for creating such a tool and presents a framework 
for doing so.
            
OVERVIEW
Enactment of the Affordable Care Act brings new opportunities for delivery 
system reforms that will yield better patient experiences, improve outcomes, 
and slow cost growth. Proponents of such reform—including the Institute of 
Medicine, the Commonwealth Fund Commission on a High Performance Health 
System, the Council of Accountable Physician Practices, the Medicare Payment 
Advisory Commission, and the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services 
(CMS) administrator Donald Berwick—have made steady progress over the past 
decade in raising the profile of delivery system improvement as a critical part 
of the solution to the health care crisis. Now, under the Affordable Care Act, an 
innovation center within CMS has been given authority to try large-scale changes 
in payment to develop new delivery system models in the interest of quality and 
efficiency. The law also includes policies to enhance payment for patient-centered 
primary care and allow new payment arrangements for health care systems that 
qualify as “accountable care organizations.”
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Many changes in the delivery system are 
already under way; the passage of the Affordable 
Care Act may accelerate them. For example, physi-
cians across the nation are already transforming their 
practices into patient-centered medical homes, a grow-
ing number of providers are exploring how to create 
accountable care organizations, and the nation has 
injected unprecedented funding into the building of a 
health information infrastructure. Significant delivery 
system overhaul will affect the structures, capabilities, 
incentives, and outcomes of the health care system 
in ways that are not fully predictable. With so many 
changes taking place at once, how can stakehold-
ers understand whether progress is being made? We 
believe there is a need for a new tool to allow the track-
ing of delivery system change (or “reform”) at the com-
munity or other large-geographic-area level. This brief 
provides a rationale for creating such a tool (or portfolio 
of tools) and presents a framework for doing so.1
Some of the necessary data elements for a 
delivery system reform tracking tool are already being 
collected by different stakeholders. We propose that all 
these elements must be brought together into a unified 
whole to create a detailed picture of delivery system 
change. Further, there are significant holes in the infor-
mation that is currently collected about the delivery 
system, and our framework outlines the additional 
information needed. We hope the brief will serve as a 
call for continued development of valid measures that 
will support efforts to track progress.
The primary goal of a delivery system tracking 
tool is to understand whether progress is being made 
in a given community. It is necessary, therefore, to 
have some notion of what progress would look like. In 
other words, what is a reformed delivery system, and 
how will we know it when we see it? As stated by the 
Institute of Medicine, we believe that the United States 
needs a health care system that is safer, more effec-
tive, more patient-centered, timelier, more efficient, 
and more equitable than the traditional non-system 
that dominates American health care today.2 In short, 
a reformed system is one in which the various ele-
ments—primary care physicians, specialists, hospitals, 
ambulatory surgery centers, etc.—can manage health 
and economic outcomes by measuring, planning, and 
executing changes to improve performance and are 
held accountable for delivering high-quality, affordable 
care and a positive patient experience.
WHY NOT JUST TRACK OUTCOMES?
A robust delivery system monitoring tool must track 
changes in the structure, functions, and outcomes of the 
health care system. While tracking outcomes is essen-
tial to evaluate progress, it is also important to under-
stand the structural and functional elements associated 
with better performance. These additional elements, 
along with outcome measures, allow for the explora-
tion of many important questions, such as:
•	 How does organizational structure relate to out-
comes? Which organizational types are most suc-
cessful? For example, do independent medical 
groups produce different outcomes than groups 
owned by hospitals?
•	 How do payment and other incentives affect capa-
bilities and, ultimately, outcomes? For example, 
will bundled payment lead to consolidation of 
health care entities? If so, what is the effect on care 
delivery models and costs?
•	 How does the market environment influence deliv-
ery system change, and how does delivery system 
change influence the market environment? Is it 
easier or more difficult to develop reformed care 
systems in highly competitive or more consoli-
dated markets?
•	 How effective are different policy options for 
improving performance and facilitating spread and 
growth?
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FRAMEWORK FOR A DELIVERY SYSTEM 
REFORM TRACKING TOOL
We propose a four-part framework for organizing the 
information that would be included in a tracking tool. 
To identify delivery system change within a defined 
geographic area and determine whether that change 
represents progress toward reform, it is important to 
have information regarding the following:
1. Structure: What does it look like? How is the 
delivery system organized, and how does it change 
over time?
2. Capabilities: What can it do? Does the delivery 
system have the tools and processes in place that 
would allow it to manage total spending and health 
outcomes?
3. Incentives: With what incentives is it provided? 
Do incentives in the external environment encour-
age the delivery system to contain costs and 
improve health outcomes?
4. Outcomes: What does it actually do? Does the 
delivery system succeed at containing costs and 
improving health outcomes?
A tracking tool would monitor delivery system 
progress in a defined geographic area and compare 
progress across areas. The ideal geographic unit of 
analysis for this purpose is not immediately clear and 
could include hospital referral regions, metropoli-
tan statistical areas, counties, states, and other areas. 
Geographic units of analysis should correspond with 
delivery system stakeholders’ ability to effect change. 
It is challenging to define a community in which effec-
tive action is possible, and where stakeholders are 
well-defined and accountable for outcomes. Further, it 
will not be possible to collect information regarding all 
four elements at every level of geographic analysis, nor 
for every component of the delivery system (primary 
care physicians, specialists, hospitals, etc.). However, 
the proposed framework would ultimately allow stake-
holders to consider the appropriate geographic levels 
and delivery system components about which to collect 
data, based on both availability of relevant information 
and the ability to effect change.
This section describes each of the four ele-
ments of the tracking tool’s framework in more detail 
and suggests possible sources of information and 
measures—some of which are already in use—for 
each element. We have chosen not to include a list of 
specific measures for each element because we want to 
encourage broad thinking about the types of informa-
tion needed, and let measure development follow from 
that need, rather than limiting the discussion only to 
types of information for which there are already good 
measures. 
Structure
The first component of the tracking framework is 
structure. We think of this as demographic or census 
information. How many providers of what organiza-
tional types—solo practices, medical groups, public 
hospitals, hospital systems, etc.—can be found in a 
community? While this information by itself does not 
indicate whether the delivery system is “reformed,” 
these data will become increasingly meaningful as 
more research links better outcomes to specific orga-
nizational models.3 Until then, there is a case for 
“structural agnosticism.” However, reform will require 
some organizational structure change, as the necessary 
systems to report outcomes and costs and to act on that 
information will require money, commitment by physi-
cians and other health professionals, and an identifiable 
management structure.
The accountable care organization (ACO) and 
patient-centered medical home (PCMH) concepts lend 
urgency to the notion of tracking and identifying orga-
nizations that could easily accept payment incentives 
designed to improve value. The most likely candidates 
for these roles are the existing multispecialty group 
practices and independent practice associations (IPAs), 
often working under per capita prepayment, either for 
all services or for some, and for all payers or some. 
Hospital medical staff organizations, physician–hos-
pital organizations (PHOs), and health plan–provider 
organizations or networks could also become ACOs.4
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We propose the following short list of organi-
zational structures that could be tracked or included as 
one part of an overall scheme for monitoring delivery 
system change. This list is meant to be illustrative, not 
exhaustive. Further, these structures are not mutually 
exclusive:
•	 multispecialty group practices of various sizes, 
both with and without an owned or affiliated health 
plan;5
•	 health maintenance organizations (HMOs), which 
may be based on one multispecialty group practice, 
two or more otherwise unaffiliated group practices, 
IPAs, a mix of the above, or unaffiliated doctors 
contracting with the  
same HMO;6
•	 independent practice associations;7
•	 physician–hospital organizations;8
•	 accountable care organizations—CMS will 
likely adopt accreditation criteria developed by 
the National Committee for Quality Assurance 
(NCQA);9
•	 patient-centered medical homes (as recognized by 
NCQA);10 and
•	 state health information exchanges11 and Beacon 
communities.12
Among these categories, there is significant 
overlap, lack of agreement on definitions of terms, and 
little clarity regarding what they actually do in terms 
of managing health or costs. However, it is necessary 
to start somewhere, and the organizations within each 
category have more in common with one another than 
do organizations across categories. (See Appendix for a 
more detailed description of each organizational type.)
Capabilities
An assessment of delivery system capabilities will 
help determine whether the system has the skills, tools, 
and processes to allow it to manage total spending and 
health outcomes. For example, the system must be 
able to define a population for which it is responsible. 
It then must measure whether patients are healthy and 
need preventive care, have chronic diseases, receive 
appropriate care, are satisfied, and if there are the right 
number and type of providers to meet patients’ needs. 
Once a system has this type of information, it must 
have the capability of acting on it to achieve goals 
of high performance. There is an extensive literature 
on the tools and processes that characterize high-
performing delivery systems.13 For some of these tools 
and processes, there are currently no good measures. 
This list should therefore be considered aspirational; 
one would want to be able to measure the following 
for the various delivery system components within a 
community:
•	 investment in and processes for quality and perfor-
mance measurement and improvement;
•	 meaningful use of information systems that can 
measure clinical and financial performance, sup-
port coordination of care, prevent errors and waste 
resulting from incomplete information, and inform 
providers of the latest and best science and its 
implications for care processes;
•	 ability to coordinate care across conditions, provid-
ers, sites, and time;
•	 use of peer review and teams;
•	 focus on primary care and prevention;
•	 ability to control the numbers and types of provid-
ers and match resources used to the needs of the 
population served; and
•	 sufficient organizational structure to allow physi-
cians to work together in economic units capable 
of accepting collective responsibility for both the 
quality and cost of health care services.
Some organizations already collect informa-
tion related to some of these capabilities. The National 
Study of Physician Organizations collects data on 
use-of-care management processes, quality improve-
ment processes, health information technology, care 
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coordination, and teams.14 The California-based 
Integrated Healthcare Association uses several mea-
sures of meaningful use of health information technol-
ogy, as well as coordination of care.15 The Community 
Tracking Study/Community Quality Index of the 
Center for Studying Health System Change collects 
data on coordination of care.16
Further work is required both to develop new, 
meaningful capabilities measures, and also to winnow 
down the list of existing measures to those most appro-
priate for a tracking tool. Such measures should be 
readily operationalized and broadly available in various 
parts of the country and for different delivery system 
components.
Incentives
A delivery system must not only have the capability 
to manage total health spending and outcomes, it must 
also have an incentive to do so. In this framework, we 
divide incentives into three domains—how providers 
and provider organizations are paid, the competitive 
environment, and nonfinancial.
Payment. True delivery system reform will require new 
payment models. Under the dominant fee-for-service 
(FFS) payment system in the United States, the more 
(or more costly) services that are performed, the more 
the patient perceives benefit, and the more the pro-
vider is rewarded. For costly conditions and care, once 
deductibles and out-of-pocket maximums have been 
exceeded, neither patient nor provider experiences 
a perception of limited resources that would call for 
cost–benefit tradeoffs, other than the physical limita-
tions of provider facilities and physician time. Central 
to the idea of “delivery system reform,” therefore, is 
the notion that we must move away from incentives 
that promote volume of services and toward incentives 
that promote better outcomes for less cost.
It is useful to think of payment incentives as 
falling on a continuum from FFS to full, global capita-
tion. In between are various hybrid approaches, such as 
care management fees for primary care only, episode-
based case rates, shared savings, and partial capitation 
(or shared risk). The relative pros and cons of these 
different incentive systems have been debated exten-
sively, but broadly speaking FFS provides no explicit 
payment for—and therefore no incentive to foster—the 
capabilities described in the previous section. Full cap-
itation, alternatively, allows organizations to invest in 
the capabilities they believe will help provide the best 
value, but also creates financial incentives to restrict 
care. Payment models between these extremes provide 
mixed incentives.
While there are many different payers in every 
community, and therefore many different approaches 
to payment incentives, communities are largely 
dominated by one approach. Being able to track the 
approaches used by different payers would help pro-
vide a picture of the payment environment in which the 
community’s delivery system operates. However, it is 
more complicated than simply counting the number of 
payers that use FFS or a different payment approach. 
Payment incentives at two levels must be considered: 
how do health care payers (Medicare, Medicaid, and 
health plans) pay medical groups and hospitals, and 
how do those organizations, in turn, pay individual 
clinicians?
The way organizations are paid and the way 
they pay their physicians are related. Robinson and col-
leagues found that medical groups and IPAs in markets 
with high managed care penetration are significantly 
less likely to pay individual physicians using FFS than 
are organizations in markets with lower managed care 
penetration.17 In a different study, Robinson found that 
medical groups facing external pay-for-performance 
incentives are more likely to pay their primary care 
physicians and specialists based on quality and sat-
isfaction than are groups not subject to pay-for-per-
formance.18 Further, medical groups under capitation 
payment are more likely to pay member physicians on 
salary and less likely to pay based on productivity than 
groups paid FFS by insurers.
Competitive environment. It is critical to consider 
the degree to which the competitive environment cre-
ates incentives for providers to be more efficient or 
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produce better value. For example, a system that looks 
“reformed” in the sense of having salaried physicians, 
information technology, care management processes, 
and so on, could also be an actual or “reputational” 
(i.e., functional) monopoly, in which efficiency gains 
are captured by providers, not consumers. Monopoly 
may be unavoidable in geographic regions too small to 
support more than one provider system at an efficient 
level of operation. A delivery system reform tracking 
tool should have a mechanism for understanding the 
extent of competition in an area to paint a realistic pic-
ture of what type of reform is possible.
In geographic areas with more than one pro-
vider system, the tracking tool must capture an addi-
tional aspect of the competitive environment—whether 
consumers have an incentive to choose higher-value 
delivery systems. While individuals who purchase 
insurance on their own are fully exposed to cost dif-
ferentials, those with employers who pay most of the 
cost will not reap the full benefits of choosing a more-
efficient plan (i.e., one with more-efficient providers). 
Further, some employers may not even offer the choice 
of an efficient, organized delivery system if a major-
ity of their workforce prefers (in part, because of the 
employer subsidy) a relatively open-network FFS plan. 
In such an environment, even with good internal incen-
tives, a reformed system may not be rewarded with 
additional market share, as the external price signals 
are not correct.19
Nonfinancial incentives. Incentives need not be finan-
cial to stimulate providers to develop the capabilities 
and achieve the outcomes discussed in this brief. Public 
reporting of results and other reputational effects can 
be very powerful. For example, as reported by The 
Commonwealth Fund in Aiming Higher: Results from a 
State Scorecard on Health System Performance, 2009, 
the worst-performing state now scores higher overall 
than the average score for all states several years ago.20
Currently, few measures of incentives can cap-
ture the complexity described here. However, census-
taking—for example, measuring the shares of physi-
cians in a community who are paid salary rather than 
FFS, the share of medical groups deriving at least 50 
percent of their revenue from capitation, or the share of 
groups receiving “pay for performance” bonuses—is a 
good place to start. In the future, as more sophisticated 
measures become available, a tracking tool might be 
able to gather appropriate information to answer the 
following questions:
•	 Do physicians and hospitals share the same rev-
enue stream or significant payment incentives so 
that physicians have an interest in holding down 
hospital costs?
•	 To what extent do financial incentives to deliver 
more (or more costly) services actually affect phy-
sicians’ treatment patterns? 
•	 What percentage of insured consumers in a market 
area have fully cost-conscious choice of alternative 
delivery systems?
•	 What are the market consequences, if any, of 
greater risk-adjusted per capita spending on the 
part of providers (for example, can higher costs 
lead to lower market share)?
Outcomes
Improved health outcomes are a critically important 
product of health care delivery systems. A delivery 
system reform tracking tool must include measures of 
the types of outcomes that can be influenced by the 
previously discussed capabilities and incentives. For 
example, simple and direct (proximate) health-related 
outcomes that a delivery system produces include:
•	 rates of preventable hospital readmissions and 
emergency room visits;
•	 rates of hospital-acquired infections;
•	 rates of ambulatory care–sensitive admissions;
•	 rates of 30-day mortality for myocardial infarction;
•	 rates of appropriate immunizations, diabetic reti-
nopathy exams, mammograms, etc.  
(as measured by HEDIS and other tools);21
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•	 rates of use of “best practices” as measured by 
tools such as the RAND Quality Assessment Tools 
system;22 and
•	 patient-reported health and functional status (from 
surveys such as the SF–36 from QualityMetric).23
While the above measures are important, they 
do not produce the complete body of information 
needed to understand fully the more profound (ulti-
mate) outcomes of a delivery system—the extent to 
which healthy people can remain healthy, the chroni-
cally ill can manage their illnesses, and the acutely ill 
can receive appropriate treatment or palliative care. 
Measures related to these ultimate outcomes might 
include items such as the percentage of breast cancers 
detected in stage 1, the percentage of joint replace-
ments needing revision surgery within five years, and 
rates of health care–acquired infections. Numerous 
organizations and government agencies already collect 
information relevant to these outcomes (Exhbit 1).24 
A delivery system reform tracking tool should 
also include information about the patient experience 
outcomes achieved by providers. How satisfied are 
patients? How easy or hard is it for them access needed 
services? To what extent does the patient perceive that 
care is coordinated across settings and time? To what 
extent is the patient included in a shared decision-mak-
ing model? Possible sources of this type of information 
include, among others: the Consumer Assessment of 
Healthcare Providers and Systems (CAHPS) sponsored 
by the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality; 
the National Study of Physician Organizations; the 
Medicare Health Outcomes Survey; and the “patient 
experience domain” collected by the Integrated 
Healthcare Association in California.25,26 
Finally, appropriate use of resources is another 
critical outcome of a reformed delivery system. While 
the field of efficiency measurement is still developing, 
a number of organizations are collecting information 
on rates of per-hospital and per-physician spending, health 
care spending per capita, acute care discharges per capita, 
percentage of surgeries done in ambulatory surgery cen-
ters, and rates of generic prescribing (Exhibit 1).27
As with measures of capabilities, further work 
is required both to develop new, meaningful outcomes 
measures and to winnow down the list of existing mea-
sures to those that would be most appropriate for track-
ing delivery system reform. 
Exhibit 1. Organizations Currently Collecting Information on Delivery System Outcomes
Organization
Tool for Gathering Information  
on Health Outcomes
Tool for Gathering Information  
on Efficiency Outcomes
Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project28 Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project;
Medical Expenditure Panel Survey29
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services Hospital, Nursing Home, and Home Health 
Compare30
Medicare and Medicaid claims data
Center for Studying Health System Change Physician and Household Surveys31 Physician and Household Surveys
Commonwealth Fund State Scorecard32 State Scorecard
Dartmouth Atlas Working Group Dartmouth Atlas of Health Care33 Dartmouth Atlas of Health Care
Integrated Healthcare Association Pay-for-performance program34 Pay-for-performance program
National Committee for Quality Assurance HEDIS35 Relative Resource Use measures (developed for 
health plans, but might be useful in the future for 
measurement at the delivery system level)36
National Institutes of Health Patient-Reported Outcomes Measurement 
System (PROMIS)37
n/a
National Quality Forum Many endorsed tools for ambulatory and inpatient 
settings38
n/a
RAND Quality Assessment Tools system39 Symmetry Episode Treatment Groups40
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CHALLENGES TO DELIVERY SYSTEM 
REFORM TRACKING
By using a tracking tool, such as the one described in 
this brief, the authors envision color-coded maps of 
communities within the United States, indicating the 
overall characteristics of the delivery systems in terms 
of their structures, capabilities, incentives, and out-
comes. There are, however, some important challenges 
to this vision.
Blank Spaces on the Map
Without much comparative effectiveness research on 
the different organizational structures, we should avoid 
prematurely committing to any organizational structure 
as the one that represents “reform.” However, with-
out some organizational structure within the delivery 
system, it will be difficult to collect any information 
about capabilities, outcomes, or incentives. In areas 
dominated by solo and small single-specialty group 
practices, therefore, there may be blank spots on the 
map. Presumably, these blank areas will shrink over 
time, as enhanced organizational structure leads to the 
availability of more data and as the ability to collect 
information where structure is lacking improves.
To date, Medicare is the most important source 
of data from those communities where there is little 
or no organizational structure in the delivery system. 
Aggregate per capita expenditure and utilization data 
are tracked by Medicare and by insurance companies, 
so there is access to some amount of performance 
information. In areas where there are large populations 
of employees of self-insured employers, third-party 
administrators may be able to report this information.
Availability of Outcomes Data
Outcomes data can be difficult and expensive to obtain 
and analyze. The cost and difficulty will diminish as 
increasing numbers of delivery systems implement 
comprehensive electronic medical records, provided 
the capabilities of these systems are compatible enough 
to allow for valid comparisons. This capability is 
important for care coordination and quality improve-
ment. In addition, the ability to track performance on 
a delivery system–wide scale is a goal of the programs 
of the Office of the National Coordinator for Health 
Information Technology. The development of out-
comes data that can be compared across communities 
and states will require an extensive effort to develop 
and adopt common definitions and standards—simi-
lar to what the Integrated Healthcare Association has 
achieved in California with its pay-for-performance 
program, which includes comparisons among more 
than 200 medical groups and IPAs, or what NCQA 
collects on a nationwide basis. Moving forward, we 
should aim to build on and use these existing systems.
Need for More Risk Adjustment
One of the primary obstacles to collecting data on 
capabilities and outcomes is the need for risk adjust-
ment to account for population differences that affect 
outcomes. There has been great progress in risk adjust-
ment of outcomes. In some cases, such as in New 
England cardiac surgical outcomes, risk-adjusted 
measures are accepted as fair and reasonable for pro-
fessional use in quality improvement, although not 
for public reporting. In addition, there has been public 
reporting of risk-adjusted cardiac surgery outcomes 
in New York and Pennsylvania since the 1990s. CMS 
publishes this information for Medicare patients with 
congestive heart failure, coronary artery disease, and 
pneumonia on its Hospital Compare Web site.41 More 
publicly reported studies such as these are needed for 
more conditions and procedures.
Rolling Up the Data
Because the goal of a tracking tool is to understand 
delivery system change at the community level, we 
would want to “roll up” data elements from the level 
of organizations to geographic regions. It may be 
possible to do this with some types of data but not 
with others. Further, while it is essential to measure 
performance for each delivery system component, it 
is equally important—yet more challenging—to mea-
sure the performance that those components together 
produce. The reverse is also true. When we observe 
an outcome jointly produced by a number of delivery 
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system components, it is also important to know how 
to allocate credit (or blame). For example, when transi-
tions from the hospital to the home are handled well, 
does the hospital or the physician receive the credit? 
Assessing macro-system performance is inevitably 
more complex than simply adding—or rolling up—
measures at the provider level to arrive at community-
level performance.
NEXT STEPS
We have outlined a framework for a delivery system 
reform tracking tool—one that would include vital 
information on delivery system structure, capabilities, 
incentives, and outcomes. Such a tool would give more 
tangible meaning to the notion of “delivery system 
reform,” uniting would-be reformers around the mean-
ing and direction of their work. This information could 
be used by policymakers to evaluate overall progress, 
identify high performers, and develop policies to help 
these high performers continue to improve and share 
their best practices with others. As data and informa-
tion systems mature and allow analysis of outcomes, 
costs, care experiences, and the organization of the 
delivery system itself, a tracking tool could also be 
used by health care purchasers to indicate directions of 
development for pay-for-performance or other incen-
tive programs. 
The framework for our proposed tracking tool 
includes categories of desired information, but it does 
not include specific measures. In some cases, good 
measures already exist to capture the relevant infor-
mation; in others, we are remarkably data poor. Even 
when good measure sets do exist, they are generally 
not designed to fit together with other measure sets. 
They cannot “talk to” one another, as they are based on 
vastly different methodologies, with different denomi-
nators, and were designed for disparate purposes. 
Stakeholders must continue important work in measure 
development. Furthermore, we would like to see stake-
holders come together around a more coherent, unified 
picture of what needs to be measured, so that disparate 
measurement activities can relate to one another and 
feed into a tool or tools that would paint a compre-
hensive picture of community-level delivery system 
change over time.
Such a unity of vision and effort requires 
leadership—an organization that will own the process 
and gather stakeholders together to achieve alignment 
of existing measures and development of new ones. 
We believe numerous existing organizations have the 
expertise for such a task. A short list includes public, 
quasi-public, and private, nonprofit organizations, such 
as the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, 
the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, the 
National Quality Forum, the National Committee 
for Quality Assurance, the Institute of Medicine, and 
the Center for Studying Health System Change. In 
the short run, there is a need for resources to explore 
the concept further and assess stakeholder support. 
Without a clear understanding of what is changing in 
the delivery system, it will be impossible to draw any 
conclusions about the impact of change on cost, qual-
ity, access, and patient experience. 
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Appendix. Glossary of Terms Related to Delivery System Organizational Structure
Multipsecialty Group Practice: A formal organization of physicians who share income, expenses, facilities, equip-
ment, and support staff, and represent multiple specialties, including primary care. The Medical Group Management 
Association defines a multispecialty group practice as having at least three physicians, although many experts would 
argue that a group cannot realistically provide a full range of specialties without a much higher number of physicians 
(i.e., 50 to 100). 
Examples: Palo Alto Medical Foundation, Geisinger Clinic, Mayo Health System,  
the Permanente Medical Group
Health Maintenance Organization (HMO): A type of insurance organization that receives a premium to cover 
a comprehensive set of services for an enrolled population and both pays for and delivers all medically necessary 
services, either directly or through contracts with providers. The providers, in turn, may be independent from one 
another, or organized into various structures. There are two types of HMOs: 1) “delivery system HMOs,” which are 
built on the foundation of a specific multispecialty medical group or groups; and 2) “carrier HMOs,” which are not 
connected to an anchor medical group or delivery system but instead contract with providers who are otherwise unaf-
filiated with the insurer and each other. These providers, in turn, contract with multiple insurers, which may include 
HMOs and others.42
In the proposed tracking tool, it would be critical to distinguish between these types. Delivery system HMOs 
tend to be organizations, and therefore counted easily, while carrier HMOs are likely to be products sold by insurance 
companies (which also sell other types of insurance products). Counting the latter would be more difficult than the 
former, as the lines between HMO products and other products are not always clear. It would still be useful to track 
this information to determine which type of HMO dominates any growth that may occur.
Examples of delivery system HMOs: Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, built on the foundation 
of the Permanente Medical Groups; Geisinger Health Plan, built on the foundation of the 
Geisinger Health System; Scott and White Health Plan, built on the foundation of the Scott 
and White Medical Clinic 
Examples of carrier HMOs: most HMO products sold by commercial insurers, such as United 
Health Care, Aetna, and Anthem qualify as carrier HMOs
Independent Practice Association (IPA): A network of physicians who agree to participate in an association to con-
tract with health maintenance organizations (HMOs) and other managed care plans. Although physicians maintain 
ownership of their practices and administer their own offices, the IPA serves as a corporate structure for negotiating 
and administering HMO contracts for its physician members.43 Some IPAs have developed capabilities far beyond 
these administrative functions, taking on responsibility for improving care delivery. Some have been successful in 
deploying electronic health records for their members, implementing utilization management processes and shared 
clinical guidelines, and creating a sense of shared identity among their members.
Examples: Hill Physicians Medical Group, Brown and Toland, and Mills–Peninsula Medical 
Group (all in Northern California); Greater Rochester IPA (New York)
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Physician–Hospital Organization (PHO): As defined by the American Hospital Association, a “closed PHO” is a 
joint venture between a hospital and physicians who have been selected on the basis of cost-effectiveness and/or high 
quality. The PHO can act as a unified agent in managed care contracting, own a managed care plan, own and operate 
ambulatory care centers or ancillary services projects, or provide administrative services to physician members. An 
“open PHO” is a joint venture between a hospital and all members of the medical staff who wish to participate, and 
serves the same functions as a closed PHO.44
Examples: Mount Auburn Hospital/Mount Auburn–Cambridge IPA (Massachusetts), 
University of California, Los Angeles, Health System
Accountable Care Organization (ACO): As defined by the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission, an ACO is a 
“set of physicians and hospitals that accept joint responsibility for the quality of care and the cost of care received by 
a panel of patients.”45 Because the key players in an ACO are physicians and hospitals, it can be considered a specific 
type of physician–hospital organization. However, the key aspect of the ACO concept that differentiates it from a 
PHO is the shared responsibility for the total care of a population. Many health care delivery organizations are cur-
rently rushing to call themselves ACOs, but it is not clear that all those using the term exhibit the core characteristics 
of joint physician–hospital responsibility for a population. The lack of common definitions makes tracking ACOs—
which may exhibit various organizational and payment models—challenging but nevertheless important.
An initial starting place for tracking ACOs may be to use the narrower definition of the term found in 
the Affordable Care Act (Section 3022): an organization of health care providers that “shall be willing to become 
accountable for the quality, cost, and overall care of the Medicare fee-for-service beneficiaries assigned to it.” 
Organizations designated as ACOs by CMS will be eligible to participate in a Medicare Shared Savings program, 
effective January 1, 2012. Under this program, ACOs may be formed by a group practice, a network of individual 
practices, a partnership or joint venture, a hospital employing professionals, or other entities determined by the sec-
retary of Health and Human Services. ACOs must: have a formal legal structure to receive and distribute shared sav-
ings; have a sufficient number of primary care professionals for at least 5,000 beneficiaries; agree to participate in the 
program for at least three years; and have the ability to report on quality and cost measures, coordinate care, and use 
enabling technologies.
Examples: No organizations have yet been designated ACOs under Section 3022. Proposed 
rules regarding the ACO Medicare Shared Savings program were released on March 31, 
2011.46 Apart from the definition of ACOs in Section 3022, however, a number of physician–
hospital collaborators in the private sector are forming new, accountable entities. Blue Shield 
of California launched an ACO project for the California Public Employees Retirement 
System, joining with Catholic Healthcare West and Hill Physicians to offer enrollees a more 
integrated care system. Premier Healthcare Alliance launched two collaboratives designed to 
help hospital systems prepare for participation in ACOs. These collaboratives will include 19 
health systems in 15 states, 70 hospitals, more than 5,000 physicians, and 1.2 million patients. 
Patient-Centered Medical Home (PCMH): As defined by the National Committee for Quality Assurance (NCQA), 
which provides recognition to patient-centered medical homes, a patient-centered medical home is a primary 
care health care setting that facilitates partnerships between individual patients and their personal physicians, and 
when appropriate, the patient’s family. Care is facilitated by registries, information technology, health information 
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exchange and other means to assure that patients get the indicated care when and where they need and want it in a 
culturally and linguistically appropriate manner.47 
NCQA’s Patient-Centered Medical Home 2011 is a program for improving primary care. The program gives 
physician practices information about organizing care around patients, working in teams, and coordinating and track-
ing care over time. There are six PCMH 2011 must-pass elements, which can result in one of three levels of recogni-
tion. Primary care practices seeking PCMH recognition complete an online data collection tool and provide docu-
mentation that validates responses. 
The American Academy of Pediatrics (AAP) introduced the medical home concept in 1967, initially refer-
ring to a central location for archiving children’s medical records. In its 2002 policy statement, the AAP expanded 
the medical home concept to include these characteristics: accessible, continuous, comprehensive, family-centered, 
coordinated, compassionate, and culturally effective care. In 2007, a set of joint principles for the PCMH were codi-
fied by the Patient-Centered Primary Care Collaborative (which included the AAP, the American Academy of Family 
Physicians, the American College of Physicians, and the American Osteopathic Association).48
Examples: NCQA maintains a list of recognized patient-centered medical homes by state.49
State Health Information Exchange: A state, territory, or state-designated entity recognized under the State 
Health Information Exchange Cooperative Agreement Program of the Office of the National Coordinator for Health 
Information Technology (ONC). This program funds states’ efforts to build capacity for exchanging health informa-
tion across the health care system, both within and across states.50 Awardees are responsible for increasing connectiv-
ity and enabling patient-centric information flow to improve the quality and efficiency of care. In March 2010, 56 
states, territories, and state-designated entities received awards under this program. In January 2011, an additional 
$16 million was made available to select states through ONC’s Challenge Grants program. This program provides 
funding to states to encourage breakthrough innovations for health information exchange that can be leveraged 
widely to support nationwide health information exchange and interoperability.
Examples: ONC maintains an online list of State Health Information Exchange and Challenge 
Grant awardees.51
Beacon Community: A community recognized under the Beacon Community Cooperative Agreement Program of 
the Office of the National Coordinator for Health Information Technology (ONC). The program funds 17 communi-
ties throughout the United States that have made inroads in the development of secure, private, and accurate systems 
of electronic health record adoption and health information exchange.52 The 17 Beacon Communities focus on spe-
cific and measurable improvement goals in three areas: quality, cost-efficiency, and population health. The goals vary 
according to the needs and priorities of each community.
Examples: ONC maintains an online list of Beacon Community awardees.53
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